Strauss

[1] The subject matter of Plato's Republic is justice. Socrates raises the question "What is justice?" and answers it. Despite this, the Republic is not a treatise but a dialog. This means that in trying to understand the Republic one must consider not only the content of the book but the form as well. We cannot help, even in such a provisional discussion, raising the question as to what is the purpose of the dialog as such. Plato has answered this question in the Phaedrus, and we can summarize his answer as follows: A dialog is a writing that is free from the defects of writings. What is the essential defect of writing according to Plato? A writing, Socrates says, is a speech that says the same thing to everyone. That, of course, in a sense is not true. We all know that the same speech, the same writing, says very different things to different readers. But Socrates does not have in mind this unintended manifoldness of meanings that writings have. A writing as writing is meant to convey a single meaning regardless of what will happen to the writing accidentally. According to Socrates, or to Plato, it is wrong to say the same thing about important matters to everyone, and the dialog was devised to avoid this evil. How then is this defect cured by the dialog? We start from the observation that it is easier to hear what people say than to see what they are talking about and how they are talking. And the speeches are easier to "get" than the deeds, and yet the deeds mean everything not said by the speakers–the speakers' characters, the situation in which they meet, and so on. And yet, on the other hand, the deeds are more trustworthy [and] less ambiguous than the speeches. If this is so, it becomes

necessary to understand the speeches in the light of the deeds, to understand the audible in the light of the inaudible. The speeches, however general, for example, dealing with justice in general, occur always in Plato in particular settings. The individual (i.e., Socrates) is talking to these and these other individuals mentioned by name at this particular time, in this particular locality, under these other particular circumstances. To get Plato's universal or abstract teaching, one must enucleate what Socrates says in these particular situations. One must enucleate from that the universal. And this is possible only by the careful consideration of the particulars. Plato has indicated the general rule that we must follow. He speaks in the same section of the Phaedrus of "logographic necessity," of the necessity governing the writing of speeches.14 In a perfect speech, according to Plato, there is nothing superfluous. Just as in a living being every part fulfills a function for the good life of the whole, in a perfect speech every part, however seemingly trivial, fulfills a necessary function for the good work of the writing, of the written speech. The function of the well-written speech is to make the reader think. Every part of the speech, every part of the Platonic dialog fulfills this function, provided we consider it, provided we think about it. This much in the way of a general introduction; now let us turn to the Republic.

The Republic is a conversation [on] justice taking place in specific circumstances. In the first place, the place where the conversation takes place is the Piraeus, the harbor of Athens, the scene of Athens's naval and commercial power. From Plato's point of view this great development of Athenian naval and commercial power was a decay. We are not in old Athens, the Athens that won the battles of Marathon

and Salamis. We live in a [2] period of decay. Connected with this is the fact that the dialog takes place in the house of a foreigner, of a metic, of a man who is not an Athenian citizen proper. The old severe order of the city has become impaired. And the third point we may mention in this connection is the occasion. The occasion on which the conversation takes place is the introduction of a new worship, a new form of worship, we might say of a new god, into Athens: innovation, decay of the old order. This is then the condition in which the question of justice is raised. The interlocutors mentioned by name are ten, ten men in the Piraeus. There had been a reaction against what Plato had regarded as the excessive democracy after the end of the Peloponnesian War, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, in which a relative of Plato had played a considerable role. At that time there were ten men in the Piraeus. Ten in the Piraeus, we can say, stands for the reaction against this decay. But if we would look more closely at these characters mentioned by name, we would see that quite a few of them (e.g., Polemarchus) had become victims of this reaction. We are not here in a situation in which a political reaction is in any way recommended. The basis of the dialog is the experience of the failure of that reaction. The reconstruction of the healthy city will take place not on the political plane at all but on a different plane. This much we may expect from the very beginning of the dialog. But I have not yet considered the very beginning of the dialog.

You remember this scene: Socrates is rushing home, rushing to Athens, from the Piraeus. He has prayed to the goddess; he has done his duty, and he has nothing else to do in that scene of evil, the Piraeus, and he is running home. He is kept back,

however, partly by force (Polemarchus threatens him) and partly by persuasion (Adeimantus promises him a wonderful show if he will stay, and even a dinner later on). This scene ends as follows:

After dinner we will get up, said Polemarchus, and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay, and do as we ask.

It looks as if we should have to stay, said Glaucon.

If this is the general opinion, said Socrates, we must act in this manner.15

We have here a prelude to the discussion of justice. Force [is] somewhere in the background, but also is persuasion. Agreement is reached among everyone except Socrates that they should stay. Socrates, as a just and sensible man, abides by the decision of everyone but him. This is the prelude of the dialog.

We see another point already from this beginning. This conversation on justice as we have it would never have taken place without some degree of compulsion. Socrates was kept back by some force represented partly by Polemarchus and partly by Glaucon. The dialog, the conversation on justice, is not an entirely spontaneous dialog. By a spontaneous dialog I mean a conversation that Socrates himself seeks. This conversation is to some extent imposed on Socrates. The dinner that they were promised and the big show, the torch race on horseback, do not take place, at least as far as we, the readers of the Republic, are concerned. We do not get the dinner. We are undergoing a training by not receiving the dinner: a training in self-control regarding food. The Republic is a very ascetic or austere dialog that shows itself in what is happening to [3] those present. Also the wonderful sight—this procession—does not come off as far as the hearers are concerned. They do not

get any sights; they get something to listen to. They are feasted by a speech.

The Republic consists obviously of two parts: a negative or destructive part and a positive or constructive part. The negative or destructive part is Book I, and the positive or constructive part is Books II–X. In Book I Socrates refutes certain opinions regarding justice. These are false opinions. In fact, they are the false opinions regarding justice. By understanding their falsity, we realize already the outlines of the positive part. Needless to say, I for one could not have realized that before having read the positive part too. But it is Plato's art that we can afterward see that the whole structure developed in the positive part is already implied in the sufficiently understood first part (i.e., Book I). Now let us remind ourselves briefly of the three definitions of justice, these false definitions that are given in Book I. The first definition may be said to be that justice is simply honesty, to pay one's debts and not to lie. The second definition is to help one's friends and to hurt one's enemies. And the third and last: justice is the advantage of the stronger. The first definition is suggested by Cephalus, the father. The second definition is given by Polemarchus, Cephalus's son. And the third definition is given by Thrasymachus, a teacher of rhetoric. Now the first definition, justice is honesty in the sense defined—to pay one's debts and not to lie—is obviously a good statement regarding justice, at least of what we all think of primarily when we say a man is just. But the second and third answers are not impressive as statements that call for immediate assent. They are based on some sophistication, on a false sophistication as it appears. Yet Polemarchus, one of the two men who gives such a falsely sophisticated answer to

the question of what justice is, is not only the son and heir of Cephalus's wealth he is also the heir of Cephalus's assertion or speech. By this remark Socrates indicates16 that the second definition, justice consists in helping one's friends and hurting one's enemies, is necessarily connected with the first and obvious definition, that justice is honesty. We must try to understand that. But first let us look very briefly at the argument regarding the first definition.

Justice consists, in the first place, of paying one's debts. But there is a question about deposits, a form of debt. It is unjust to return deposits if the deposit is a gun and the former depositor is now insane. It is unjust to return the gun to him, obviously. But the other part of the first definition—that justice consists in not lying—is not discussed at all and hence is not refuted. Now we see here the connection with the positive part. You know that later on, in a crucial section, it is asserted that the best city, the perfectly just city, requires what is called a noble lie. That means it is just to lie in a certain manner, a white lie of the highest order is required by justice. If that is so, it cannot be true that justice consists simply in not lying. This silence about not lying right at the beginning foreshadows the later discussion about the noble lie.

Now let us look at the second definition. Justice consists in helping one's friends and hurting one's enemies. This definition is refuted, and [4] the conclusion is that justice consists in not hurting anyone. A just man would not hurt anyone. One could wonder at this point whether this is good enough. Is a man who never hurts anyone but also never helps anyone a just man? Would we not have to go on from here and say justice consists indeed in not hurting anyone

but also in helping everyone as far as we can? Would it not be sensible then to say that justice fully understood consists in human kindness? But we know (if we have read on) that this cannot be the answer given in Plato's Republic because the ruling part in Plato's best city, the guardians, are men who must imitate dogs. Dogs are characterized by the fact that they are kind to their acquaintances and rather vicious to strangers. This is maintained throughout the Republic. Now if this harshness to strangers is essential to the most just city, justice simply cannot be identical with charity, human kindness, or whatever it may be. These two points that we have considered now—(1) not lying, (2) justice is not hurting enemies and helping friends—come together in the statement on the noble lie in the following way: The noble lie consists partly in the assertion that the citizens of the perfect city have been educated and reared beneath the earth. This is an obvious falsehood that must be taught for certain reasons; the reason is that they all must believe that they have the same mother, and thus they will be brothers among themselves. The brotherhood of men requires, according to this scheme at least, that there is a common mother, and this common mother is the earth. But while the statement of this part of the noble lie is made, Socrates makes the subtle change from earth to country, from g e to ch ora.17 And so he says: you are brothers because you are all sons of the same country. He replaced the natural kinship of all men by a fictitious natural kinship, by a merely proclaimed natural kinship of the citizens of a given political society. Not all men are brothers but only all fellow citizens are brothers, and from here we understand the strange definition of justice given by Polemarchus. What Polemarchus is driving at, perhaps without

knowing it, is that the notion that justice is patriotism, is identical with being friendly to one's fellow citizens and being harsh to strangers. Justice is patriotism, but nothing but patriotism. But as such, and within these limits, it is dedication to the common good, to the common good of this particular city, of this particular civil society. Justice means indeed full dedication to others, to be a slave to others as Plato says somewhere,18 but to the other members of the community or to your polis. Honesty is not enough; one must be public-spirited, one must be fully patriotic. This is then the second common notion about justice which is discussed, and in a way disposed of, in the first book of the Republic. To repeat: the first defines justice as honesty; the second defines justice as public-spiritedness, full dedication to the common good of this or that particular society to which one happens to belong. I mention the fact that this definition of Polemarchus is the second or central definition. As will appear later, Polemarchus is very close to Socrates; he is much closer to Socrates than Cephalus on the one hand and Thrasymachus on the other. And in a certain critical situation in the first book, it is Polemarchus who defends Socrates. And now if we look forward to the positive part of the Republic, we see that this definition—justice is dedication to the common good of this particular society—is not only never questioned, it is even the principle from which all institutions, or almost all institutions, characteristic of Plato's best polis necessarily follow.
[5] I turn now to the third definition, the definition given by Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus puts the cart before the horse. He is a somewhat strange character, and he obviously loves to shock. So he states the most shocking implication of his view of justice before he

has stated the perfectly sensible starting point of his contention. He never states really this sensible starting point, but at a certain moment his conversation with Socrates is quasi-interrupted by Polemarchus on the one hand and Cleitophon, a friend or pupil of Thrasymachus, on the other. It is a brief section consisting of seven speeches, which I shall call the intermezzo. Now from this brief discussion it appears that justice is here understood as consisting in obeying the rulers. In any orderly society obeying the rulers means ultimately obeying the law, because the rulers themselves are supposed to obey the law. The view of justice from which Thrasymachus starts is then best described as follows: Justice is identical with legality or law-abidingness. To show how Thrasymachus's official and explicit thesis derives from this simple, commonsensical assertion that justice is identical with law-abidingness, the following reflection suffices: In every political society the law is made, of course, by the lawmaker or lawmakers. Who the lawmaker is depends, as we say, on the constitution, on the political order of the society. In a monarchy it would be a king; in a democracy it would be the citizen body assembled or duly represented. The law always reflects the opinions and the wishes of the ruling body. The ruling body could very well be the majority of the citizens; that is one special case. Thrasymachus then asserts there is not and cannot be a ruling body that does not establish the laws with a view to its convenience, with a view to its interest or advantage. So that if we are just in obeying the laws, we are in fact doing what is to the advantage, actual or presumed, of the rulers. But whatever we may think of that analysis, the starting point of Thrasymachus is commonsensical, something that we all mean also when we ordin-

arily speak of the just man: justice is legality or law-abidingness. One could perhaps say that this definition—justice is law-abidingness—is perhaps even more evident to begin with than the reply given by Cephalus according to which justice is identical with honesty. There can be conflicts between law-abidingness and honesty, and our primary inclination might very well be to say: "In case of doubt, obey the law rather than follow your views of honesty." One could say more than that: The reply that justice is identical with legality or law-abidingness is the first opinion because it is the most authoritative opinion. It is the opinion of the polis. The polis defines justice as consisting in obeying the laws of the polis. Now when we read the speeches of Thrasymachus and his exchange with Socrates, we must not only listen to Thrasymachus we must also […]
[Tape changed]
[…] Plato19 steps forth and guarantees the payment for the fine. Moreover, Thrasymachus in his discussion with Socrates forbids to Socrates certain answers. The term "forbidding" occurs more than once in the Greek text: Thrasymachus is someone who forbids to say certain things; He is an authority. In a word, he is the polis; he acts or plays the polis. Acting the polis, and the polis appears primarily as the forbidding thing, Thrasymachus gives the definition of justice, which is most clearly that [6] of the polis, namely, obey the law of the polis and do not appeal from the polis to any higher authority.
We have then discerned three definitions of justice underlying the explicit definitions given in the first book: Justice is honesty; Justice is public-spiritedness or patriotism; Justice is legality. We can say that these are the three pre-philosophic or ordinary opinions on

justice existing in every society. Of these three definitions, only the second one, namely, the definition according to which justice is public-spiritedness or patriotism is preserved to some extent in the later argument. And this definition, to repeat, is the central definition. We can say this definition, which on the most superficial level reads "justice consists in helping friends and hurting enemies," but applied to the polis it means justice consists in helping the fellow citizens and in hurting the strangers or the potential or actual enemies of the city, is preserved and is even the key to the positive definition of justice given in the Republic. For what is the positive teaching of the Republic? The complete subordination of the individual to the city, the complete subordination of what is proper and peculiar to one to the common—the most extreme statement of the principle of patriotism. Communism in the sense in which Plato means it goes much beyond what is now called communism and is in fact absolute communism. It is communism not only regarding property but regarding women and children as well. This positive structure of the Republic, of the best city of the Republic, can more simply perhaps be understood by starting from the first definition (i.e., justice is honesty) or to use the traditional definition of justice, justice is a constant and perpetual will of assigning or leaving to everyone what belongs to him. This definition is not discussed by Plato explicitly, but an implicit discussion is present, as can easily be seen from the following consideration: Justice is said to consist in giving everyone his due. But what is a man's due? What the law says is his. But what if the law is unjust in the first place? Then by being formally just, you are substantively unjust. This definition can be maintained, then, only

if we say justice consists in giving everyone that which is truly his, that which is his by nature and not merely by positive enactment or by convention. This again leads to the doctrine of the Republic, justice consists in assigning to everyone those goods and those functions that are best for him and therefore best for the community. This principle, strictly understood, is incompatible of course with private property, because the legal heir to a fortune may be morally ruined by the possession of that fortune and would be much better off if he were to do some useful work in a mine perhaps. Moreover, if this is true, if justice consists in assigning to everyone those goods and those functions that are best for him, for which he is best fitted, then the rulers must be absolute rulers. Moreover, they must be rulers who are truly wise, who are the best judges of what is good for the soul of each of their subjects. They must be physicians of the soul, able to judge what is good for the soul just as physicians are the best judges of what is good for the body. The absolute communism and the rule of the wise men are implied in this simple reflection.
In the first book we have these three definitions and therefore these three parts: the Cephalus part, the Polemarchus part, and the Thrasymachus [7] part. But if we look, we see that the Polemarchus part is the central section. And I have explained why it deserves to be central. But if we look at the Republic as a whole, it is not Polemarchus who is at the center but Thrasymachus. I remind you of the fact that from Book II on there are two interlocutors who control the scene almost everywhere, Glaucon and Adeimantus. So we have first a couple (father and son), then Thrasymachus, and then the two brothers. In the light of the Republic as a whole, Thrasymachus

is the central figure. I will try to explain in what sense Thrasymachus is the center. I have said that he states the most obvious thesis of the polis regarding justice (i.e., justice is identical with legality). And by his conduct he is described in a way as representing the polis, nay, being the polis. There are two later scenes in which Thrasymachus comes to sight and reveals the true significance of that man. The first is at the beginning of the fifth book. Here a scene at the beginning of the Republic is repeated. Someone is touching someone on the shoulder and dragging him to him just as it happened at the beginning. Just as the scene at the beginning culminated in a kind of vote, where Socrates said: If it is the common opinion, the opinion of all of you, we must abide by that. The second scene also culminates in a vote. The most striking difference between these two voting scenes is this: In the first book Thrasymachus was not yet present as a voter. In the second scene (at the beginning of the fifth book) Thrasymachus also contributes his vote. At the beginning of the Republic, before the conversation starts, we have a kind of germinal society or polis to which Thrasymachus does not belong. By the beginning of the fifth book, after the building up of the just city has already well advanced, Thrasymachus has become integrated into the polis. This great work, the perfect and just city, built up in the Republic requires that Thrasymachus find his place in it somehow. What is that place? What is that function? In the sixth book we receive the answer. At a certain moment someone is trying to stir up a quarrel between Socrates and Thrasymachus. And Socrates says: "Do not stir up that quarrel. We have become friends just now while we have never been enemies." They have never been enemies, but their relation has changed

just now toward one of friendship. What has happened? We have to consider what happened just now to understand what induces Socrates to say we have now become friends. The context is this: At this point we have understood or learned all the features of the best polis–absolute communism plus the rule of philosophers. And we have learned that the best city stands and falls by the rule of the philosophers. But how is this possible? Is it not absurd to demand of a citizen body that it should submit to the rule of such strange people, the philosophers? The answer given there by Socrates is that it is possible. The many can be persuaded to submit to the rule of philosophers. The many are not as bad as these reactionaries like Glaucon and Adeimantus say. Now what is persuasion? Persuasion is an activity that can be transformed into an art. The art of persuasion is rhetoric, and Thrasymachus was an outstanding teacher of rhetoric. Without the use of the art of Thrasymachus the rule of the philosophers would be absolutely impossible, and therefore Thrasymachus symbolically represents the belonginess of rhetoric in the best city. Yet we learn gradually, when we go on and follow the argument, that persuasion is not as strong and effective as it appears to be in these remarks of the sixth book. It appears, for reasons that are not given [8] but reasons that are not too difficult to understand, that it is not sufficient that the philosophers rule this perfectly communist society. Before the philosophers can begin to rule, they must expel the whole citizen body, in fact everyone older than ten. Only those younger than ten may remain in the city because they are still young enough to be molded by the philosophers. As for those older than ten, that is hopeless. Even the best rhetoric and the most perfect progressive educa-

tion could not change them. We, as reasonable readers, as politically serious people, must raise the question: Is this still a possible political suggestion? Is It imaginable that any citizen body, which has not lost its bearings completely and does see its way to survival, might conceivably submit to the rule of a philosopher or to philosophers? But they would not submit, I believe, to the rule of philosophers with this string attached to it—that they are driven out of the city and rusticated for the rest of their days, and the philosophers permitted to rule their children.
Persuasion cannot have this great power. And to indicate this limited power of persuasion, two examples are sufficient. First, Socrates's own fate: he was unable to persuade the city of Athens to acquit him of the charge of which he was accused; and the comical aspect of the same thing: Socrates was unable, despite his great power of persuasion, to rule his own wife. If, then, the power of persuasion is not as great as it is presented for a moment at the peak of the argument of the Republic, the conclusion follows inevitably that the best city as described in the Republic is not possible. And this is confirmed by a number of other considerations.
I would like to add a few more points.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that this complicated roundabout way through that communist city ruled by philosophers is not a possible political suggestion, the Republic does contain Plato's or Socrates's answer to the question about what justice is. And this answer is given explicitly: Justice consists in minding one's own business, in doing one's own work, with this qualification to which only an allusion is made: Justice consists in doing one's work well. This means justice consists in doing well the work of man as man.

And man as man is the thinking being. Justice, therefore, consists essentially and primarily in thinking. As the Socratic formula is, virtue is knowledge. While justice in the strict sense is not possible in the polis and for the polis, it is possible in the case of the individual. Now this has one great implication. The best city as described in the Republic, if possible, would be self-sufficient. It would not be in need of other cities except accidentally. It would be concerned entirely with its own goodness and improvement. It would not serve other cities. But the parallelism between the best city and the best man implies that the same is true of the best human individuals. They are self-sufficient in the sense that their justice consists exclusively in their self-improvement. For them there is no compulsion. They do what they spontaneously do, and this distinction between the voluntary and compulsory on this level is incidentally the basis of the distinction between voluntary or spontaneous and compulsory dialogs to which I referred before. You recall the passage in the Republic about the philosopher's going down to the cave (which is compulsory); Glaucon is for a moment feeling that this is a great injustice to the philosophers, that they are compelled to go down to the cave again—to which Socrates replies that it is not unjust in this case because our [9] best polis, this allegedly perfect polis, has enabled them to dedicate themselves to philosophy. But the application to cities other than the best is obvious. In the world as it always was and as it always will be, the return to the cave of the practical or ordinary life is not justly inflicted on the philosophers.

The Republic in its presentation of the just city can very well be called a utopia in the common sense of the term. It describes an order that the author

knew was impossible, incompatible with the nature of man. A closer study of the philosophic teaching proper of the Republic would show that the Republic is not only a political utopia but a philosophic utopia as well. The whole political scheme of the Republic as presented there is based on the premise that knowledge of the highest theme, what is called the good or the idea of the good, is available. It is possible, I think, to show that Plato did not believe this is true. The description in the Republic of philosophy at its peak is in its way as utopian as the description given in the Republic of the polis at its best. We may say the Republic as a whole is based on a deliberate overestimation of the power of the human mind. And a consequence of this is the overestimation of the power of persuasion of which we have noted some traces: the overestimation of persuasion, or negatively expressed, the underestimation of the power of force, of bodily force. The power of the body is recognized in the Republic to some extent. The body is the limit to communism. Everything can be communized—houses, fields, even thoughts as is very well known today in the age of super-propaganda; but the body, its feelings and sensations, cannot be communized. No one can feel another man's toothache, to say nothing of other things. Despite the fact that the body is recognized in the Republic throughout as the limit of communism, it is nevertheless true to say that it is characteristic of the Republic, not of other dialogs of Plato, that it is based to some extent on an abstraction from the body. I mention only one example, although I cannot elaborate it: the

treatment of the two sexes in the Republic is a clear proof of this disregard of the body. Therefore, the

question of man becomes in the Republic the question of the human soul alone. Plato speaks in the Republic of the tri-partition of the soul: reason, spiritedness, and desire. A similar tri-partition occurs in the dialog with Phaedrus, where the soul is compared to a charioteer, to horses, and a chariot. The chariot is the body. The chariot does not occur in the Republic. The question of man, of the unity of man, becomes, therefore, in the Republic the question of the human soul, of the unity of the human soul. There is reason and there is the subrational part. The bond, the unifying bond between reason and the lower part, is called in the Republic the spiritedness. Spiritedness, anger, indignation, however we might call it, is that which justifies the unity of man. To understand that one has to consider the fact that in the Republic, as distinguished again from the other Platonic dialogs, eros, desire, love, is depreciated in a very extreme way. Only one point can be mentioned here: The tyrant, injustice incarnate, is presented as eros incarnate. From here we can understand that the descent to the cave, meaning the descent of the philosopher from the contemplation of the truth to living with other human beings, is in the Republic presented as due only to compulsion, precisely because the power of eros is here denied. The philosopher is presented here as [10] unnaturally self-sufficient. He is not in need of potential philosophers; therefore, he can only be compelled by exterior force to return to the cave. The problem to which we are led by this observation is this: What is the connection between the fact that the Republic is a utopia in this extreme sense, that it is both a philosophic and political utopia, and the high praise, the unusually high praise of spiritedness, which I will

now loosely translate as moral indignation? The philosophic and political utopia of the Republic mean this: Man is presented as possessing a much greater freedom, freedom from the body in particular, than he actually possesses. The Republic suggests that it depends on man's free choice entirely what way of life he chooses—the scene at the end in the myth of Er. Man is infinitely responsible. That is the implication of the utopia. If man is infinitely responsible, the power of moral indignation regarding human imperfection is proportionally increased. The utopian character of the Republic and the emphasis on spiritedness, anger, moral indignation, are inseparable from each other.

I must leave it at these remarks, although I want to make it clear that the point toward which I was working is this: Realizing the impossibility from Plato's point of view of the best political order as presented in the Republic, we are entitled to call the Republic a utopia in the sense defined. The Republic is a utopia not only politically but philosophically as well. This is its unique characteristic among Plato's writings. On the other hand, the characteristic of the Republic compared with the other Platonic writings is the depreciation of eros, of love, and the corresponding promotion of spiritedness, anger, indignation, or however we might translate it. The question would then be: How are these two striking characteristics of the Republic connected with each other? For it is safe to assume in every Platonic dialog that there is a necessary connection between its various elements.

14. Phaedrus, 264b7.
15. Plato, Republic, 328a–b.
16. MS. is corrupt here. "indicates" is inserted by the editor.
17. 414e.

18. Plato, Laws, 890a8–9.
19. MS. seems corrupt. If Strauss is referring to Republic 337d "Plato" should perhaps be replaced by "Glaucon." Another possibility is that he is referring to Apology 38b.
20. The "individual" in the transcript is replaced by "spiritual."